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BOOK REVIEW

John Kleinig, Paternalism (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld,

1984), 242 pp.
Paternalism is often thought of as coercive interference with a
person's liberty that is justified by appeal to the welfare or interests of the person being coerced. In this useful book, John Kleinig
argues that one can influence a person's behavior for paternalistic
reasons without coercing that person or directly interfering with
his or her liberty or action, and thus he prefers to consider paternalism in a broad sense that is defined by two elements: "an
imposition and a rationale. X acts to diminish Y's freedom, to
the end that Y's good may be secured" (18).

The result of this broad conception of paternalism is to make it
unlikely that a categorical negative judgment about paternalism
will be reached. When paternalism is conceived broadly enough
to include things that diminish a person's freedom without coercing him or her (such as putting a fence around a hazardous area)
it is much less plausible to hold that it is always morally wrong.
Kleinig thinks that some cases of paternalism are justifiable, and
the book tries to identify and evaluate considerations that are
relevant to deciding when paternalism is and isn't justifiable.
Kleinig's overall position is that although paternalism is sometimes
justifiable, it "is not something to be evangelistic about. It is not
a substitute for persuasion and education, but a strategy of last
resort" (70).
Kleinig considers a number of arguments against paternalistic
actions. These include: (1) "The Argument from Oppression of
Individuality," which claims that paternalistic impositions violate
the demands of individuality or - in more Kantian language - fail
to respect mature people's capacities for rational choice; (2) "The
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Argument from Paternalistic Distance," which claims that those
who act paternalistically are generally less well placed to understand the welfare of the person whose freedom they reduce than
that person him or herself; and (3) "The Argument from the
Developmental Value of Choice," which argues that people
should be left free to make their own mistakes so that they can
learn from them. Kleinig holds that arguments 2 and 3 do not
rule out all cases of paternalism, and thus holds that the Individuality argument, with its Kantian overtones, provides the strongest

barrier to paternalism. "Of the various objections to paternalism,
the most powerful relates to what is regarded as its insulting,
demeaning or degrading character" (38). One would expect from
this endorsement that much attention would be given to this sort
of argument, its weight, problems, and limits, but this expectation
is disappointed. Kleinig seems prepared to endorse the "liberal"
view that the liberty principle is absolute within its proper scope,
but little argument for this position is offered. The view of some
"intuitionists" that principles such as liberty and welfare must be
weighed against each other on a case-by-case basis is not considered.
Kleinig offers a survey and evaluation of rationales for paternalism, and gives a good treatment of rationales based on human
interconnectedness. His conclusion about them is that "the

various arguments from interconnectedness have at best a limited
validity, carrying some weight in contexts where an assignable
duty or others can be established, but otherwise coming into
contention only where self-regarding failure occurs on a large
scale" (45). He also considers, and reaches largely negative conclusions about, arguments from freedom promotion and protection, and arguments from consent, including subsequent consent
or gratitude.

Kleinig thinks that the most promising rationale for paternalism is "The Argument from Personal Integrity." It distinguishes
desires that are central to one's life plan from peripheral desires
and inclinations (e.g., a desire not to be bothered with seatbelts)
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that may conflict with the deeper desires. He suggests that restric-

tions on the latter involve no disrespect to autonomy and individuality. "Where our conduct or choices place our more permanent,
stable and central projects in jeopardy, and where what comes to
expression in this conduct or these choices manifests aspects of
our personality that do not rank highly in our constellation of
desires, dispositions, etc., benevolent interference will constitute
no violation of integrity. Indeed, if anything, it helps to preserve

it" (68).
This restricts the scope of the liberty principle; it suggests that
only choices central to one's overall life plan must be left free
from interference. When we are disposed "to act in ways that

are perilous to the projects and plans that are partially constitutive
of our identity ... paternalism may not be violative of integrity"

(73).
But lest acceptance of this rationale for paternalism lead to
excessive interferences with people's freedoms, Kleinig suggests
a number of restrictions on its application. These include a preference for least restrictive alternatives, a presumption in favor
of paternalistic impositions that accord with the recipient's
own conception of good, a preference of effective over less effective impositions, and a requirement that social spinoffs be taken
into account (74-77). These seem, however, to be little more
than requirements of institutional rationality.
As noted above, Kleinig rejects justifications for paternalism

that are based on subsequent consent or gratitude. Robert E.
Goodin has recently advocated this sort of justification very
forcefully, claiming that it alone can account for what one ought
to do in the following case:
Imagine Ian, a Glaswegian dockworker of times past. Ordinarily a reliable
fellow saving faithfully to marry his childhood sweetheart, Ian nevertheless
is weak and knows it. He realizes that if he receives his pay with everyone
else on Friday afternoon, he will be unable to resist the temptation to join
his mates in the pub and drink away his week's wages. So he arranges for his
supervisor, Alistair, to collect his pay and not give it to him until teatime
Sunday. Alistair's task is a difficult one, for every Friday Ian comes begging
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he be given his pay packet. But it is not a thankless one, for every Sunday
Ian proves grateful.'

thinks that the most plausible rationale available to
Alistair for denying Ian's Friday requests is the fact that Ian is
grateful every Sunday, and will continue to be grateful in the
future (except on Friday afternoons prior to his marriage).
Kleinig's alternative justification in this case would appeal to the
fact that Ian's desire to save money to marry his sweetheart is
more central or integral to his life plans than his desire to drink
with his friends on Friday afternoons. Both of these positions
require judgments that are difficult to make - and thus are
vulnerable to abuse by those who wish to rationalize their manipulations of others - but Kleinig's position seems to me to be
the more plausible by far.
The second part of Kleinig's book is devoted to applications of
his theory. He offers excellent discussions of paternalism in
respect of physical protection (seatbelts, suicide), health, longterm welfare (children, political paternalism), the marketplace
(consumer protection, labor laws), and personal character. As in
his theoretical treatment of paternalism, Kleinig proceeds here
Goodin

by identifying, analyzing and evaluating arguments for and against
paternalistic measures.
There are four possible views about the justification of an
apparently paternalistic law or social policy. First! one may
hold it unjustified. Second, one may hold that paternalistic
grounds alone are sufficient to justify it. Third, one may hold
that non-paternalistic (public interest) grounds alone are sufficient to justify it. And fourth, one may hold that although
neither paternalistic nor public interest grounds alone is sufficient to the law or policy, the combination of these considerations is sufficient to justify it. Concerning mandatory seat belt
legislation, Kleinig takes the fourth position. Although he rejects

.

1 Robert E. Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy, (Chicago: University
42
of Chicago Press, 1982), p.
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the view that the liberty to refrain from wearing seat belts is not
in general an appropriate kind of liberty to be covered by the
liberty principle (89), he holds that the desire not to be bothered
by seatbelts is generally not central to people's lifeplans and major
projects - and thus falls outside the scope of the liberty principle.
"The Argument from Personal Integrity claims that seat belt and
safety helmet legislation may be justified because the reasons why
many people fail or even refuse to wear them do not accord
with their own acknowledged goals, purposes, attitudes and
values - or at least not those they value highly" (90). Kleinig
holds that this argument provides partial support for seat belt
legislation, and that public interest considerations provide the rest.
Kleinig is more critical of paternalistic arguments for promoting
health by regulating unhealthy habits such as smoking. Unlike
failures to wear seatbelts, Kleinig judges such vices to be "associated with significant pleasures" and thus thinks that interferences
with them are likely to "violate concerns of real importance to

the individual" (110). Because of this, Kleinig holds that the
Argument from Personal Integrity carries no weight in these
cases. My worry about this is that the difference in pleasurableness
between riding unencumbered by seatbelts and smoking two packs
of cigarettes a day seems a shallow and inadequate basis for
deciding whether or not something is sufficiently central to one's
lifeplan to fall under the liberty principle. This illustrates one of
the difficulties in applying the Argument from Personal Integrity.
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